Will
You Really Sell Me the Brooklyn Bridge and You'll Let me Rename It?
Recently, I’ve read eloquent tomes filled with
CorkerWarnerJohnsonCrapo (CWJC) accolades
and the requisite dumping on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The authors extol CWJC and crap on F&F.
They start with the assumption that Fannie and Freddie should
be destroyed because they were flawed and made mistakes and that CWJC
machinations are the answer to all problems in the nation’s primary and
secondary mortgage markets (since the latter drives to the former).
I have problems with many of these “Johnny’s come lately”
because it’s all GSE blame and little insight, let alone anything positive
about Fannie’s and Freddie’s success at sustaining the nation’s mortgage
markets.
When these “experts” talk about the 2008 mortgage market financial
meltdown, which prompted the Bush Administration to take over Fannie and
Freddie--and the Obama Administration to keep them in indentured servitude--you
almost never see any discussion that while F&F had woes, it occurred mostly
from buying private label subprime mortgage bonds from the major NYC firms—not
with failures of their own in-house generated MBS. The latter produced some losses but
nothing close to what befell the “out house”
(appropriate term for them) securities F&F purchased.
CWJC Beneficiaries
&%&# Up Big Time
Few articles condemning F&F carry any critical discussion
about that disastrous commercial bank/investment handiwork.
During 2005 - 2007, the major New
York institutions created--outside the Fannie and Freddie systems--$2.9
trillion in marginally underwritten, non-guaranteed, but highly rated private
label mortgage backed securities (PLS) and sold them worldwide.
Relying on claims made in SEC
filings, Fannie and Freddie did purchase some of the most senior triple-A-rated
tranches in PLS, primarily for reasons that had nothing to do with affordable
housing goals. But we now know from legal documents in lawsuits, which Wall
Street banks have been eager to settle, that the vast majority of PLS were
riddled with fraud.
Consequently, shortly after they
were issued, these garbage non-F&F mortgage bonds quickly failed and
produced @$725 Billion in
losses not counting the CDO red ink created from the underlying PLS.
The PLS mortgage
securities had losses seven and a half
times greater than F&F MBS And
that $725 Billion doesn’t include an additional billions in losses from
synthetic CDOs created by those Big Apple financial stalwarts based on the
underlying PLS.
In contrast, when Uncle
Sam took them over, Fannie and Freddie need $187 Billion in federal cash
infusions and since every penny has been repaid, including a surplus, now at
$15 Billion but soon to grow larger as both entities announce their 1Q 2014
earnings.
As one sided as that performance was, none of the CWJC boosters are
willing to acknowledge their proposed legislation gives mammoth new market power and
wealth via the delivery of a new federal subsidy to the very institutions which
just 7 years ago committed financial mayhem on the world through their issuance
of near worthless mortgage bonds.
The nation’s largest banks already run their regulators
ragged, going under, over, around, and behind them. (I’m tired tallying the
laundry lists of violations and near criminal activity for which they have been
fined in the past two years).
Why
the Senate's Big Bank Largess?
Can a brand spanking new federal regulator truly control
the voracious TBTF institutions, especially if their “real federal regulator” (the
Fed or the OCC) doesn’t want the FMIC to mess with a holding company or a
national bank?
If you say “yes,” then you’ve spent some time recently in
Colorado and Washington states sampling their newest local products.
Why will bank behavior be any different this time?
I’m not the only commentator pointing out to Senate
legislators how much they would give the nation’s largest banks in return for
what?
This gets me to another bothersome issue.
Most of the CWJC advocates disparage Fannie and Freddie
and talk about the FMIC and its proposed aggregators,
guarantors, and insurers, as if they are certainties which already have
slain the mortgage beast, provided attractive products, reasonably priced for
American families across the income continuum, with marginal losses totally
covered by some yet to be raised $500 Billion in fairy dust capital (did I
mention CWJC may cure the heartbreak of psoriasis, halitosis, and athlete’s
feet?). Step right up and buy a bottle of
Uncle……!
FMIC
in the Bush, Better than F&F in the Hand?
This mortgage market savior doesn’t exist yet, let alone has
it created its first mortgage, but the Senate desperate are lining up as if it
is the “mortgage Lourdes.”
Senators are touting the CWJC and how much it will reduce government
financial obligations, the risk sharing the private sector is taking on (you mean
the banks with their FDIC cheap deposits, that private capital?), and the words
from every public official’s mouth are rich with promise, certitude and assured
positive results.
Pretty soon they will announce how many new jobs it will
create.
It hasn’t even passed the Senate Banking Committee and,
if it does, it may never get to the Senate floor for major political reasons having
nothing to do with Fannie and Freddie, let alone smooth and efficient mortgage
financing?
Suddenly every one accepts as truth what every Senate pol claims
about CWJC and that it all will come true in a reasonable time frame. (Senator, I have some Las Vegas real estate, if you
are in a “buying” mode?)
Aren't we fortunate that politicians never lie, inflate, or exaggerate about
future results.
The Senate is reshaping a totally new way for 20% of our
national economy to operate, rewarding major financial miscreants, and covering
all of its inevitable mistakes with taxpayer’s promises.
Senators insist that CWJC will provide mortgage bounty
for everyone because—as we know from Pentagon weapon systems to energy saving, not
to mention healthcare--everything Congress builds happens seamlessly and with
no interruptions, no delays, no cost overruns, and no losers.
I Think It’s
This Way Lassie…
The FMIC is so far down this country road that Timmy and
Lassie never may find, even with Opie and Barney Fife’s help. Its sponsors talk
hopefully about five years, but don’t exclude 10 or even 15 years of phase in.
I also think the CWJC’s affordable housing provisions are
a joke, a ruse, something which sounds much better than it can possibly perform
because—unless it gets dramatically changed— CWJC doesn’t compel, force, or statutorily
require lenders to make mortgage loans to low income families, very few will be
made.
A “low income fund” sounds nice, but it’s like the banks paying
fines for manipulating LIBOR or laundering Mexican drug money (both of which
our big financial behemoths did), it’s a cost of doing business, but don’t look
for any lender to heavily utilize it if they are not compelled by law to do so.
Why
Not Reconsider Fannie and Freddie?
Because it would undercut their case for a “new day,” GSE
faultfinders seldom point to the F&F progress which the post 2008 regulation
has produced.
Neither F nor F can buy or securitize the low quality
loans which was part of their pre-2008 undoing.
The “books” of business they have put on in the past few
years have been exemplary because of the new rules and credit standards under
which they must operate (I would loosen them a bit and I hope their regulator
does), but when detractors talk about fixing F&F risk just what are they
describing?
The two are limited in their portfolio size, they largely
securitize or guarantee loans which conform to the Consumer Finance Protection
Agency’s QM (quality mortgage) standards, and whatever seasoned bad loans still
are on their books are curing or rolling off, in the natural order of portfolio
lenders.
To me, this seems to be a lot of achievement, productivity,
experience, success, and market familiarity to throw in the trash heap
especially in exchange for promises and hope that the big banks don’t run
roughshod over their regulators, again.
The GSE denigrators claim they know the problems with
Fannie and Freddie, but--if they do--does it really require CWJC's earthmoving, system
changing upheaval, and financial uncertainty as the “fix,” especially when the
sponsors only are going to put the whole kahuna on the federal budget (plus
what’s left of Fannie and Freddie after the Congress fillets them)?
Just Junk CWJC.
The Congress can get a lot more housing finance done,
still make desirable changes to Fannie
and Freddie, and preserve that which has worked—and a lot has—for less money,
in less time, with less chance of failure and systemic breakdowns and far less
political jousting which could occur when the Senate Banking Committee meets to
markup CWJC.
Who
is Saying What?
And this story in Compass Point, from Isaac Boltansky
Conservative
Groups Voice Opposition. On
April 22, a group of ~25 conservative groups – some far more significant than
others – sent a letter to members of the Senate Banking Committee voicing their
opposition to the Johnson-Crapo GSE reform bill. The letter cites a number of
concerns including: (1) an “increase in moral hazard and taxpayer risk”; (2)
an opposition to the construct of the housing trust funds in the language;
and (3) the treatment of current shareholders under the 3rd
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (PSPA) which would be codified under
Johnson-Crapo. We believe that the conservative core on the Senate Banking
Committee was already squarely opposed to the Johnson-Crapo language and this
letter will only fortify their stances. As our vote count below illustrates, we
continue to count Senators Vitter (R-LA), Coburn (R-OK), Toomey (R-PA), and
Shelby (R-AL) as “likely against” the Johnson-Crapo bill. We highlight the
letter from conservative groups because we continue to believe that as
leadership aggressively courts the liberal contingent on the committee, it
runs the risk of losing a handful of right-leaning supporters of the original
Corker-Warner proposal.
Maloni, 4-24-2014
|
14 comments:
The beat goes on.
The National Urban League just sent a letter to Banking Committee Senators opposing CWJC over reduced availability of low income mortgage assistance.
Unfortunately, ever statement or meme the GSE reform proponents use is an outright lie. Someone needs to be held accountable for each and every one of these statements on why the GSE's need to be abolished, including the president. Here are several statements they cannot back up with documentation or proof. If they can prove all these things will happen with GSE reform and wind down, then a bill can be approved. Otherwise the whole effort is just a fraud.
1. We need private capital back to have healthy housing - Great, re-privatize Fannie Mae and let new private participants compete.
2. Taxpayer off hook from losses - This is really homeowner vs taxpayer. I agree taxpayer should not pay for homeowner losses. This has nothing to do with which securitizer you use, just has to do with getting taxpayer out of equation, therefore getting government out. Fine, re privatize Fannie Mae and take government out of equation. Other securitizers can then compete with Fannie Mae.
3. Private can price risk better - Great, re-privatize Fannie Mae and let new securitizers prove they can price better.
4. Banks will be better at securitizing than Fannie Mae - Let's see some proof of that. Delinquency rates and 18 FHFA lawsuits show differently.
5. Fannie Mae too risky in it's loan practices with sub-prime loans - See point 4, all others were actually worse. A good regulator will help control this for all the new private participants.
6. Fannie Mae must support housing goals - Great, that can be stripped away. Some other government program can come in and support affordable housing with a separate initiative approved by congress.
7. Seven Deadly Sins? - abnormally low capital requirements; shamefully weak regulatory oversight; an implicit guarantee by the U.S. government; retained portfolios with an insatiable appetite for assets that fueled excessive risk-taking; a distinctively large lender bias that placed small firms at a competitive disadvantage; a mission seeking to maximize shareholder value and political franchise value at the same time; and heavy Congressional meddling that introduced enormous political distortions in the form of excessive affordable housing targets into the secondary market. -
All those sins above have either been fixed or will be fixed by the time Fannie is re-privatized.
8. Need to provide more liquidity to market - This will not happen by taking the 2 main securitizers away, the opposite will actually happen.
Matt--Excellent points all of them, cogent and well made.
While I appreciate the fact that you read my blog and comment, add your views to other forum, either as Matt Hill opinion pieces or article commentary on what others say, with whom you agree or disagree.
The more that the Obama Administration and those on the hill are challenged over their predicate for CWJC, the better the chances of reasonable mortgage finance reform occurring.
Go for it!
Thanks Bill. Good suggestion. I put it out on the FnF google message board and will start from there.
Thanks!
Matt--Consider the American Banker, National Mortgage News, "Restore Fannie Mae" website, The Hill, Politico and Huff Post depending on how much you discuss the Congress or White House, and any number of self publishing methods, sending your material to key audiences.
Apparently, there also are a few F&F message boards you can hit.
Bill...a colleague and I were discussing the upcoming court date recently. I'm sure highly unlikely, however, what about the idea of a sort of stay on any further (earnings) dividends to the TSY? Basically, given the pending lawsuits, would it even be a remote possibility that the plintiff(s) would try to argue for building capital (v. the current sweep) pending a decision from the court? Obviously the govt. would fight like mad against such an idea. Just thinking out loud...
GW
oops...meant to say 'plaintiffs'
GW
GW--I am assuming you mean could the Court impose a stay on dividend payments to Treasury and revive GSE dividend payments to the investors?
While a final decision might encompass that, I doubt strongly whether any judge would reach that as an "interim decision," pending a final resolution.
You've more or less stated your own answer.
I am sure that government would object to anything which appears to be the Court offering a partial victory to the plaintiffs in advance of a final decision, when the Court just as easily could decide for the government.
The Court will decide on the Court's timetable, for which all interested parties just will have to wait.
My opinion--as a non-lawyer--is that the plaintiffs will prevail on a major part of this, the "third amendment" matter; not sure if they can get any traction on "conservatorship" issues.
But, I can't even guess on what the Court's decision could include, given the $$$$ involved.
And then you have the "appeals" question.
Maybe that's the point where you might get some "haggling," i.e. "We wont' appeal, if you'll agree to.......?"
Bill...sort of figured your answer, and/or answered my own question. Thanks -
GW
Thanks for the suggestions Bill. I will definitely take action on many of those.
Folks--Not sure yet, but some stuff just erupting re next week's markup.
Communications from FHFA (Directory Watt) raising serious question about the bill, plus an published amendment (widely predicted) that would limit "vertical integration" and other issues of power concentration.
Stay tuned.
yeezy boost 350
yeezy
kd 11
supreme hoodie
golden goose
off-white
kyrie irving shoes
air jordans
jordan 11
yeezy 700
replica bags 168 mall replica nappy bags replica bags chicago
click here to read aaa replica bags look at here now replica bags buy online see here replica bags china
Post a Comment