Questions
for FHFA’s Mark Calabria
Since
Mark Calabria was approved as director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FFHA)
last year, his congressional hearings seldom delved into major policy
issues. There may have been a few substantive questions asked and answered, but
little major follow-up. (It helps witnesses who understand a little obfuscation
can eat up the congressional “5 minute rule,” especially when few of the questioners
comprehend the history and nuance of the issues at hand).
I have
several questions for Mark Calabria, which I hope he answers to this blog (fat
chance!)
Any Calabria/FHFA
answers will faithfully be reprinted without any edits.
If the
Q’s appeal to them, the same questions could be used as a primer for Senators,
MoC’s, or congressional staff, the next time the Director testifies on Capitol
Hill, or engages media following a major industry speech.
--What
is the total headcount at your agency and what was it when you came on board? Do
you anticipate it remaining stable at that level?
--Specifically,
by function, what do those workers all do? How many have been there 10 years or
longer? Does FHFA need additional employees, as you have suggested? If so, what
roles would they perform?
--Would
you—as Freddie Mac management has announced it will—audit your employees to see
if their numbers still are necessary and have the contemporary skills required
to perform oversight responsibilities?
--It’s
been suggested that you slow walk, most issues facing the GSEs. Why is that
inaccurate?
--You
have been disinclined to praise the GSEs for their mission success and very low
losses (much of it accomplished without regulatory support and some time with regulatory
hostility). What is your reluctance?
--With
the significant managerial strength at each company and systemic problems rising in the mortgage market), why do you seem chary to endorse the
various ways Fannie and Freddie—besides mortgagor forbearance-- can support borrowers,
lenders and others currently stressed in the mortgage finance chain, as per
David Stevens’ suggestions? (BTW,
I suspect the Fed and Treasury will solve the servicer illiquidity.)
--Was
it a coincidence that your hired two execs—with conservative
credentials—shortly before FHFA began clomp,
dragging most GSE deadlines and extending those target dates? Is there a
connection between those events?
--How
closely did you work with Craig Philips, Steve Mnuchin’s former Wall Street assistant,
before the latter was removed from Treasury and departed DC?
--Is
it true before leaving his Treasury post, Philips largely put together an “End the
GSE Conservatorship” plan? What happened to Philips’ GSE recommendations?
--In
your opinion did Philips possess the experience, skill, and expertise which you
later sought in outside consultants you hired to complete the capital and “Conservatorship”
exercise??
--Other
than being large financial companies, why do you insist on claiming big banks
and the GSEs need the same capital rates, when they are so disparate re
mission, function, and risk? Banks conduct domestic and international commercial and residential lending,
while the GSEs are limited primarily to insuring securities composed only of US
residential mortgages??
--Do
you believe major banks and the GSEs can be safe and successful, working in
conjunction with one another, while having varied capital rates, or are you
stuck on the meme, “more capital is better?”
--Do
you recognize there is a cost, i.e. higher consumer mortgage rates, to excess
GSE capital? Does that concern you?
--When/If
the GSEs ever are freed by ending their Conservatorship, have you thought
through your changing (reduced) responsibilities and will you recognize the primacy of the GSEs’ private
owners and boards of directors in corporate matters??
--Will
that recognition cause you to reduce your agency headcount, since theoretically
FHFA will have less work?
--As a
sign of goodwill to GSE shareholders, do you have any plans, to facilitate
relisting both companies on the major stock exchanges?
Maloni,
4-11-2020
Happy
Easter to all who celebrate!!
16 comments:
All good questions. Waiting for answers.
You should have titled the blog as Rhetorical Q's
I'm sorry to inform you at this late time ... but you may have missed the most important question of all which is ..
Who's buried in Grant's tomb ?
Or as some folks on "The Hill" still say in hushed voices .... "Where did Bill and Hillary bury Ulysses anyway ?"
First Anon--
I'll print them as promised--unedited--if he or anyone in the agency answers them.
**********************************************************
Second Anon--
If this blog has a life after seven days or so, you have my permission to call it whatever you want.
*************************************************
MrF--thanks for reading and writing.
I was going to ask, "what weighs more, a pound of feathers or a pound of iron?", but was afraid he would seek another outside counsel for an answer and that would mean even less going to the GSEs for capial.
While we watch and wait for another round of this ongoing game of hide the weenie to play out ...
I thank you for all your efforts and to you and yours .... be safe always
MrF--
And you and yours my friends!
Here are some more questions.
Q1. Does FHFA Director has any incentives to do anything useful or responsible when FHFA Director:
1. is unaccountable to any one in Gov or to any one stakeholder
2. has unlimited funding from conservatees without any oversight or approval
3. has no fiduciary duties to conservatees and company owners, investors and lenders
4. has no clear delegated duties and responsibilities from Congress but has very broad authorities to do whatever he wants as per his interpretations of HERA.
Q2. Why would Calabria as a private citizen severely criticize UST Sy and FHFA Director for violating laws and bankrupting FnF, and then continues to do the same after becoming FHFA director?
Is not Calabria another opportunistic revolving door crony bureaucrat?
Q3. What is preventing FHFA from implementing White House policy directives at the earliest?
Q4. Why Calabria never talks about correct insurance business model of FnF and the capital that is appropriate for insurance business model?
05. Is it appropriate for FHFA Director Calabria to criticize conservatees publicly and after that continue as conservator or even a regulator?
06. Why FHFA as a housing finance regulator and conservator considers its business as matter of national security and wants to hide from public scrutiny?
Is not FHFA trying to hide and protect violators of law and who abused the Gov power to benefit their cronies?
Q7. Will FHFA ever allow other private conservators to abuse the conservatees in the same way FHFA has been abusing for last 12 years?
Q8. Why FHFA Director is not updating all stakeholders on regular basis through FHFA website?
Q9. Why FHFA Director is benefiting only few paid subscribers by allowing "subscription pay walled" private media and publications to interview him on public/official matters?
Anon 1---
Congratulations. Your Q's are more on point than mine.
You should consider doing a blog and then I can bedevil you.
Do you think either of us will get better answers from MC, beyond, "Nah, nah, nah, nah, nah, because I don't want to!"
That's why I suggested some Senator, Member of Congress, or media person ask his any of mine or your questions where there is a public record!
Stay healthy and angry. Thanks
Anon 1--
I tried to make you a hero and posted your Q's on InvestorsHub today,
under post "More questions for Calabria."
Bill,
Thanks, All FnF shareholders appreciate your contributions in this fight of common man (David) against loan sharking mob bureaucracy supported by conniving judiciary (Goliath).
Please help us to understand the problem of servicers.
Why are servicers blaming Calabria for not providing forbearance liquidity?
How much liquidity these servicers are supposed to carry?
Please explain what are the obligations of these servicers.
Anon 1--
See the formal definition of the servicer.
https://www.bankrate.com/glossary/s/servicer/
Remember servicers get paid by the GSE to perform that role. When the servicer also is the seller, they make more from each loan delivered to the GSEs.
See this from IMF today about the problem.
As COVID-19-related forbearance requests from mortgagors pile up, it stands to reason that some MBS issuer/servicers could hit the wall, not necessarily in April but by May or June for sure. Will Congress act or will it just appeal to the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, as House Financial Services Committee Chairman Maxine Waters, D-CA, did late Wednesday?...
As we’ve noted before, the MBS plumbing works like this: the consumer pays the servicer and the servicer remits to the bondholder. But if the mortgagor doesn’t pay because of forbearance, there’s a problem. Some nonbanks have cash on hand/lines of credit to make MBS payments for a little while, and some don’t. Pretty soon, the tide will go out...
One veteran consultant suggested to us that the only way to get Washington’s attention on the issue is to get a large nonbank servicer to fail. Okay, but which one?...
Today's issue involves mortgagors whose loans have been put into MBS by a guarantor (generally Fannie and Freddie), When payer, who for one reason or another including FHFA approved forbearance, can't/won't/don't make their monthly payments, the process gets gummed up.
Any time part of the mortgage payment chain gets throttled, it impacts all other pieces.
Unless the servicer--responsible for paying the guarantor who then pays the MBS investor--has huge lines of bank credit to cover the failure to generate the collective monthly payments it puts pressure on the entire system, from bondholders eventually to GSEs, as well as other services. (See tightening among some banks re servicers underlying assets.
Who, what should pick up the servicer's liquidity shortcomings? The answer is anyone (institution) which has money, i.e. Fed, Treasury, or even the GSEs FHFA willing.
Also, Tim Howard, has written in his last several Q's and A's about this problem (and sympathizes with the servicers seeking federal support.
(Sorry for the delay in getting back to you.)
Bill, Thanks for the details.
This WSJ Andrew Ackerman WSJ story--with good detail--just came over the wires, too. As noted in my last blog--to which you so elegantly commented--Amid my Q's, I told Calabria not to worry, since I felt the Fed and Treasury couldn't/wouldn't ignore the servicers.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mnuchin-under-growing-pressure-to-help-struggling-mortgage-companies-11587067908?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1
One last servicer issue explanation produced by former Freddie CEO Don Layton.
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/americas-housing-finance-system-in-the-pandemic-part-3-qa-on-the-ugly-fight-over-servicer-advances/
No Good Deed.....
There will be a "pop quiz" tomorrow on "What issues confront mortgage servicers, why, and what is the relief?"
I'll waive the normal $5 fee for those taking the test and compete for the $1 Million first prize.
Send all responses to the Mortgage Bankers Association, c/O Robert Broeksmit.
(If you win, we can discuss my finder's fee later.)
Maloni--Working on a new blog; will be out in day or two.
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